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I
Questions concerning the scope of the Francovich
judgement continue to come before the Court, and the
principle of state liability for breach of Community law
was again discussed in Joined Cases C-178/94, C-188/
94, C-189/94 and C-190/94 Erich Dillenkofer and
Others, 8 October, 1996. In this case the Court considered
that Germany was financially liable for failure to
implement the Directive on package travel within the
prescribed period. In its judgement, the Court repeated
its previous ruling to the effect that where a Member
State fails to take the measures necessary to implement
a Directive within the specified time limits, that Member
State has manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits
of its discretion in the exercise of its rule-making powers.
Such a breach gives rise to a right to reparation on the
part of individuals if the result prescribed by the Directive
entails the grant of rights to them, the content of those
rights is identifiable on the basis of the provisions of the
directive and a causal link exists between the breach of
the State’s obligation and the loss and damage suffered
by the injured parties. It is not necessary to take any
other conditions into consideration. As a result, two
consumers were entitled to bring compensation actions
against Germany for losses arising out of the insolvency
of two operators from whom they had purchased a
package holiday.
II
With respect to the free movement of goods, case C-
313/94 Fratelli Graffione SNC v. Ditta Fransa, 26 of
November 1996, concerned the interpretation of Articles
30 and 36 of the EC Treaty and Article 12(2)(b) of the
First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December
1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States
relating to trade marks. The Scott multinational group of
companies had been prohibited from selling various
products in Italy under the Cotonelle trade mark on the
grounds that it might mislead consumers into thinking
that the products in question actually contained cotton.
However the Scott group continued to use the trade
mark in France and Spain. Fransa, who owned a
supermarket in Italy, continued to sell products under
the Cotonelle trade mark and Graffione brought an
action against them on the basis that Fransa was infringing
rules on unfair competition. Graffione claimed that as a
wholesaler he was placed at a competitive disadvantage
as he was prevented from obtaining products bearing
the Cotonelle trade mark directly from Scott in Italy,
while Fransa continued to import them from other
Member States where the trade mark is still valid. In its
judgement the Court considered that an injunction
prohibiting the marketing of the products did constitute
an obstacle to Community trade and if the marketing of
the products under the trade mark was generally
prohibited, then this constituted a barrier to the free
movement of goods and it was necessary to establish
whether it was justified in the interests of consumer
protection. In this respect, the Court considered that the
possibility of allowing a prohibition of marketing on
account of the misleading nature of a trade mark is not,
in principle, precluded by the fact that the same trade
mark is not considered misleading in other Member
States. Linguistic, cultural and social differences between
the Member States may give rise to a situation in which
a trade mark is liable to mislead consumers in one
Member State but not in another. The Court considered
that the Trade Mark Directive was not relevant to the
principal issue in the case as Article 12(2) of that
Directive leaves it to national law to determine whether
and to what extent the use of a revoked trade mark may
be prohibited.
The full Court delivered another judgement
concerning the issue of patent protection under
Community law in Joined Cases C-267/95 and C-268/
95, Merckx & Co v. Primecrown and Beecham Group
plc v. Europharm Ltd, of 5 December last. This case
concerned the extent to which a patent holder may
oppose parallel imports of a drug in cases where those
imports come from a Member State where their products
are marketed but are not patentable. One of the questions
put to the Court concerned the scope of the rule in Case
187/80 Merckx v. Stephar and Exler 1981 ECR 2063, in
which the Court held that an owner of a patent protected
by the legislation of a Member State may not rely on that
legislation to oppose the importation of a product which
has been lawfully put on the market in another Member
State by the owner of the patent, even where the product
was not patentable in the Member State concerned.
Merckx and Beecham argued that this principle should
be either over-ruled or restricted in the light of new
circumstances. However the Court considered that the
ruling in Merckx v. Stephar and Exler was still valid.
While the Court admitted that certain circumstances had
changed, it was nevertheless of the opinion that if a
patentee could prohibit the importation of protected
products marketed in another Member State by him or
with his consent, he would be able to partition national16
markets and thereby restrict trade between the Member
States. The Court pointed out that if a patentee decides
to put a product on the market in a Member State where
it is not patentable, he must accept the consequences of
his choice as regards the possibility of parallel imports.
It seems that the Court was partially influenced by the
fact that the situation addressed in the Merckx case is set
to disappear as pharmaceutical products are now
patentable in all the Member States.
Another question addressed in the case concerned
how far the Merckx case applies where patentees are
legally obliged to market their products in the exporting
State. The Court pointed out that in such a case, the
patentee cannot be deemed to have consented to the
marketing of the products concerned and is therefore
entitled to oppose the importation and exportation of
those products in the State where they are protected.
However there must be a genuine existing obligation to
market the product concerned in the exporting State. On
the other hand, the Court ruled that Merckx does apply
to situations where ethical obligations compel patentees
to provide supplies of drugs even where they are not
patentable. The Court considered that such
considerations are not such as to make it possible to
properly identify the situation in which the patentee is
deprived of his power to decide freely how he will
market his product.
Another interesting case concerning the free
circulation of medicinal products occurred in Case C-
201/94, The Queen v. The Medicines Control Agency, ex
parte Smith & Nephew Pharmaceuticals Ltd and between
Primecrown Ltd and The Medicines Control Agency
which was decided on the 12 of November 1996. This
case concerned the interpretation of Council Directive
65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative
action relating to proprietary medicinal products and of
the obligations associated with the authorisation of
proprietary medicinal products. However, it is not
intended to discuss this case in the context of the present
article.
III
One of the most controversial cases which has come
before the Court in this period concerned EC Labour
Law. In Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v. Council, 12
November, 1996,  which concerned the so-called
Working Time Directive (OJ 1993 L 307, P. 18), the UK
brought a 173 action against the Council seeking
annulment of the Directive on the basis that it was
adopted on the incorrect legal basis. The Directive was
adopted on the basis of Article 118a, and the UK
claimed that it should have been adopted on the basis of
Article 100 of the EC Treaty or Article 235. After a
detailed analysis of the working of Article 118a and of
the objectives of the Directive, the Court concluded that
it had been adopted on the correct legal basis. Moreover,
the Court expressly stated that neither Article 100 nor
Article 100a could have constituted an appropriate legal
basis. However, the most interesting aspect of the case
was not the judgement itself but rather the reaction of the
UK government. Following the announcement of the
ruling, John Major indicated that London would ask for
the legislation to be modified in the framework of the
IGC. The British Prime Minister also indicated that the
UK would block any agreement on the reform of the EU
if the changes to the Treaties called for by London were
not accepted.
IV
Two rulings of interest were handed down in the area of
social security law. In Joined Cases C-245/94 and C-
312/94 Hoever and Zachow v. Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen, 10 October, 1996, the Court was asked
whether a child-raising allowance can be treated as a
family benefit within the meaning of Article 4(1)(h) of
Regulation No. 1408/71. In response to this question,
the Court reiterated previous case-law to the effect that
a benefit is to be regarded as a social security benefit if
it is granted to recipients without any individual and
discretionary assessment of personal needs on the basis
of a legally defined position and if it concerns one of the
risks expressly listed in Article 4 (1) of Regulation No
1408/71. The child-raising allowance in question
therefore fell within the Regulation as it constituted a
legally defined right and was granted automatically to
persons fulfilling certain objective criteria, without any
individual and discretionary assessment of personal
needs.
Another question put to the Court concerned the
rationae personae of the Regulation. Neither Mrs. Hoever
nor Mrs Zachow were covered by the Regulation
themselves, however both their husbands were. It was
therefore argued that they could not rely on the Directive
by virtue of the judgement in Case 40/76 Kermaschek
1976 ECR 1669, where the Court ruled that members of
a worker’s family can only claim derived rights under
the Regulation. In response to this claim, the Court
pointed out that the scope of the rule in Kermaschek was
limited in Case C-308/93 Cabanis-Issarte, 30 April
1996, where the Court held that the former case was
limited to cases in which a member of a worker’s family
relies on provisions of Regulation 1408/71 which are
applicable solely to workers and not to members of their
families. The Court considered that this was not the case
with Article 73 of the Regulation, the precise purpose of
which is to guarantee members of the family residing in
a Member State other than the competent State the grant
of the family benefits provided by the applicable
legislation. The Court concluded that the distinction
between personal rights and derived rights does not in
principle apply to family benefits.
V
The second case concerned Directive 79/7 and the issue
of equal treatment for men and women in matters of
social security. In case C-77/95 Bruna-Alessandra
Züchner 7 November, 1996, the Court was presented
with an ingenious argument aimed at extending the17
personal scope of application of the Directive. The case
concerned the wife of a paraplegic who provided him
with both therapeutic treatment and general care and
home nursing. She claimed that she should be considered
as a member of the working population since she
provided care for which she had to undergo training and
which, by virtue of its nature and scope, could be
assimilated to an occupational activity. If she did not
provide such care, it would have to be provided by
someone else against payment, or in a hospital. The
Court however refused to accept this interpretation. In
the first place, it pointed out that the term ‘activity’
included in Article 2 of the Directive can only be
construed as referring to an activity undertaken in return
for remuneration. In addition, it was of the opinion that
to adopt the proposed interpretation would have the
effect of infinitely extending the scope of the Directive.
In this respect the Court pointed out that the education
of children, housework, and the management of private
property are all activities which require a degree of
competence and must be provided by an outside agency
in return for remuneration if there is no one else who will
do so without payment.
VI
In the area of environmental law, the Court was asked
to interpret the scope of application of Directive 85/337
on the assessment of the effects of certain public and
private projects on the environment (Environmental
Impact Assessment Directive). Thus in Case C-72/95,
Aannemerbedrijf P.K Kraaijeveld BV v. Gedeputeerde
Staten an Zuid-Holland 24 October, 1996, the Court
was asked whether the expression ‘canalisation and
flood relief works’ covers certain types of work on a
dyke running alongside a waterway. The Court
considered that such work was covered by the Directive
despite the divergences existing in the different language
versions. In this respect the Court considered that in
situations where there are differences between the various
versions of a Directive, it is necessary to interpret the
Directive in accordance with the purpose and context of
the rules of which it forms part. The Court pointed out
that it was clear from Art 3 that the Directive was
intended to have a wide scope and a broad purpose and
consequently the Court concluded that dyke works
were covered.
Various other cases in the area of environmental
law concerned actions against Member States for failure
to implement various environmental directives within
the prescribed periods.
VII
In  Case C-73/95, Viho Europe v. Commission, 24
October, 1996 the Court upheld a ruling of the Court of
First Instance concerning the application of Article 85
(1) to conduct which occurred within a group of
companies. The Court considered the company
concerned (Parker) and its subsidiaries formed a single
economic unit and that the subsidiaries did not enjoy
any real autonomy in determining their course of action
in the market but merely carried out the instructions
issued by the parent company controlling them. The fact
that Parker’s distribution policy, according to which its
subsidiaries were required to restrict the distribution of
Parker products to their allocated territories, had the
effect of dividing the various national markets and was
capable of producing effects outside the Parker group,
was not sufficient to make Article 85 (1) applicable.
VIII
Case C-311/94 Ijssel – Vliet Combinatie BV v. Minister
van Economische Zaken, 15 October, 1996, concerned
the field of state aid law. The case arose because the
Ministry for Economic Affairs refused an application
for a subsidy for the construction of a fishing vessel.
This refusal was challenged in the national courts, and
a reference was made to the Court of Justice. The first
question sought to establish whether the Commission,
when exercising its powers under Arts 92 and 93 of the
Treaty, can adopt guidelines requiring compliance, not
only with the competition rules but also with those
relating to the common fisheries policy, even when the
Council has not expressly authorised it to do so. The
Court considered that not only was the Commission
entitled to take account of considerations relating to the
common fisheries policy when assessing whether aid in
the fisheries sector is compatible with the common
market, it was essential for it to do so. In response to the
second question posed by the national court, the Court
of Justice went on to say that the guidelines issued by the
Commission must be taken into consideration by the
Member States when deciding on an application for aid
for the construction of a vessel intended for fishing and
that the Guidelines are binding on the Member States.
IX
The Court was called upon to interpret the Second
Council Directive (77/91/EEC) in Case C-42/95 Siemens
AG v. Henry Nold, 19 November, 1996. Essentially the
national court wished to know whether the Second
Directive, and in particular Article 29 (1) and (4),
precludes a Member State’s domestic law from granting
a right of pre-emption to shareholders in the event of an
increase in capital by consideration in kind and from
subjecting the legality of a decision withdrawing the
right of pre-emption to a substantive review. Article 29
(1) of the Directive provides that whenever capital is
increased by consideration in cash, the shares must be
offered on a pre-emptive basis to shareholders in
proportion to the capital represented by their shares.
Article 29 (4) authorises the general meeting in certain
circumstances to decide to restrict or withdraw that
right. In its judgement, the Court of Justice, first
emphasised that the Second Directive seeks to set out a
minimum equivalent protection for both shareholders
and creditors of public limited liability companies. The
Court then pointed out that the fact that the provision
only applies to cases in which the capital is increased by18
consideration in cash does not mean that the Community
legislator elected to restrict the shareholders right of
pre-emption to such cases, thereby precluding Member
States from extending it also to increases in capital by
consideration in kind. On the contrary, the fact that the
Second Directive does not deal with this situation means
the Member States remain at liberty to provide or not to
provide for a right of pre-emption in such a case.
X
In cases C-317/94, Elida Gibbs v. Commissioners of
Customs and Excise  and Case C-288/94 Argos
Distributors v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise,
which were both decided on the 24 October 1996, the
Court confirmed the principle that value added tax may
only be charged on the actual payment made by the
consumer. The use of different voucher schemes such as
money-off and cash back vouchers means that only the
value of the goods or services actually received are
taxable. The Court considered that the fiscal
consideration is a ‘subjective’ value (the money actually
received in each case) and not a value estimated according
to objective criteria.
Other interesting cases include: Joined Cases C-
283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94 Denkavit International
BV, VITIC Amsterdam BV and Voormeer BV v.
Bundesamt für Finanzen of the 17 October 1996, which
concerned the interpretation of Articles 3 and 5 of
Council Directive 90/435 of 23 July 1990 on the common
system of taxation applicable in the case of parent
companies and subsidiaries of different Member States.
XI
The Brussels convention was interpreted in Case C-
383/95 Rutten v Cross Medical Ltd which was decided
on 9 January last. Article 5(1) of the Convention provides
that in matters relating to a contract, a person domiciled
in one Contracting State may be sued in another
Contracting State. Employers may be sued in the place
where the employee habitually carries out his work or,
if the employee does not habitually carry out his work in
any one country, the employer may also be sued in the
courts for the place where the business which engaged
the employee was or is situated. In relation to this
Article, the Court ruled that where an employee carries
out his work in several Contracting States, the place
where he habitually carries out his work is the place
where he has established the effective centre of his
working activities.
In Case C-78/95 Bernardus Hendrikman and Maria
Feyen v. Magenta Druck & Verlag GmbH which was
decided on the 10 October 1996, the Court of Justice
was asked to consider Article 27 (2) of the Brussels
Convention. This Article provides that a judgement will
not be recognised where it was given in default of
appearance, if the defendant was not duly served with
the document which instituted the proceedings or with
an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him
to arrange for his defence. The Court was asked whether
this Article applies in a case where the defendants were
represented by a lawyer, but the lawyer concerned was
not authorised by the defendants to appear on their
behalf. The Court held that in such a case the defendant
must be regarded as a defendant in default of appearance
within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention.
XII
The Court has been called upon to interpret the principle
of legitimate expectation in a number of cases. This
principle was again at issue in Case T-336/94, Effisol v.
Commission which was decided on the 16 October,
1996. This case concerned a company which was issued
an import quota for the chemical product CFC 11 but
was subsequently refused an import licence. The
company claimed damages from the Commission for
breach of the principle of legitimate expectation. The
Court of First Instance held, in accordance with previous
case-law, that while an individual may rely on this
principle in situations in which the Community
institutions have led him to entertain justified
expectations this is not the case ‘if a prudent and
discriminating trader could have foreseen the adoption
of a Community measure likely to affect his interests.
The company was consequently refused damages on the
basis that the issuing of the import quota and the issuing
of a licence were two independent stages and the
company was not justified in assuming that because
they had obtained a quota, they would also obtain a
licence.
XIII
Case C-143795 P. Commission v. Socurte was decided
on 9 January 1997. This case concerned the extent of
notification which is required before the time limit for
an  annulment action starts to run. Although the
Commission argued that it is sufficient for the two
month period to start if the parties receive information
from which the existence of a decision can be inferred,
the Court of Justice upheld the Court of First Instance’s
ruling to the effect that notification necessarily involves
the communication of a detailed account of the contents
of the measure notified and of the reasons upon which
it is based.
XIV
Finally it is of interest to note that on 9 December 1996,
the Court of Justice issued a Note for Guidance on
References by National Courts for Preliminary
Rulings. In point 6 of this Note, the Court states that an
order for reference should include: a statement of the
facts which are essential to a full understanding of the
legal significance of the main proceedings; an exposition
of the national law which may be applicable; a statement
of the reasons which prompted the reference; and,
where appropriate, a summary of the arguments of the
parties. ❑